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It is not just confusion!
Strategic uncertainty in an experimental asset market
Eizo Akiyama Nobuyuki Hanaki Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Abstract
To what extent is the observed mispricing in experimental asset markets caused
by strategic uncertainty and by confusion? We address this question by comparing
subjects' initial price forecasts in two market environments: one with six human
traders, and the other with one human and ve computer traders. We nd that
both strategic uncertainty and confusion contribute equally to the median initial
forecast deviation from the fundamental value. The eect of strategic uncertainty
is greater for subjects with a perfect score in the Cognitive Reection Test, and it
is not signicant for those with low scores.
To what extent are the observed price deviations from the fundamental value in exper-
imental asset markets (Smith et al., 1988) caused by strategic uncertainty (uncertainty
about the behaviour of others) and by individual bounded rationality (or confusion)?
First, we describe the context in which this question is posed.
Consider an asset with a nite life of T periods. Each unit of the asset pays a constant
dividend D at the end of each period, and becomes worthless after the nal dividend
payment at the end of period T . Under these conditions, the fundamental value of a unit
of the asset during period t (t = 1; 2; :::; T ), FVt, is the sum of the remaining dividend
payments, i.e., FVt = (T + 1   t)D. If these conditions are commonly known, common
knowledge of rationality implies that if rational traders trade this asset, it will only be
at its fundamental value.
Following the seminal study by Smith et al. (1988), it has repeatedly been shown for
a variety of experimental conditions and subject pools, that the market prices of assets
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deviate substantially from their fundamental value in these experimental asset markets.1
Such deviations in observed prices from the fundamental value (mispricings) were
initially considered to result from strategic uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about others'
behaviour) by Smith et al. (1988). They noted that `what we learn from the particular
experiments reported here is that a common dividend, and common knowledge thereof,
is insucient to induce initial common expectations. As we interpret it, this is due to
agent uncertainty about the behaviour of others' (Smith et al., 1988, p.1148).
An implication of this is what Lei et al. (2001) called a \speculative hypothesis." That
is, `traders are uncertain that future prices will track the fundamental value, because they
doubt the rationality of the other traders, and therefore speculate in the belief that there
are opportunities for future capital gains' (Lei et al., 2001, p.832). Lei et al. (2001) tested
the \speculative hypothesis" by performing a set of experiments in which capital gains
were not possible because resale of the assets was prohibited. Based on the observed
mispricings even in the absence of capital gain possibilities, Lei et al. (2001) rejected
the speculative hypothesis and noted that `the hypothesis that the traders are rational,
and that the bubble is due to the fact that this rationality is not common knowledge,
cannot be the whole story behind the bubbles' (p.857). Instead, they suggested the
\active participation hypothesis"; i.e., subjects in these experiments who were trained
to engage in trading simply wanted to trade (even if such trading resulted in incurring
losses) because there were no other activities available to them during the experiment.
Huber and Kirchler (2012) and Kirchler et al. (2012) also suggested that these mis-
pricings were mainly due to subjects being confused about the nature of the declining
fundamental value of the asset in the experiment. Kirchler et al. (2012) also showed that
mispricing due to confusion was further fuelled by increasing the amount of cash relative
to the number of assets available in the market as a result of dividend payments during
the experiment.2
1In the original experiment in Smith et al. (1988) as well as in many other studies, the value of the
dividend payment in each period, dt, was determined randomly from a known i.i.d. distribution. Thus,
the fundamental value of the asset was dened as FVt =
PT
p=t E(dt), where E(dt) is the expected
dividend payment. Porter and Smith (1995) eliminated the uncertainty about dividend payments by
investigating the eect of varying degrees of risk aversion among subjects. No signicant dierence was
found in the observed pattern of mispricing in the experiments with uncertain dividend payments. See
Stockl et al. (2010) and Palan (2013) for surveys.
2This conclusion is in contrast with an earlier study by Noussair et al. (2001) that showed substantial
mispricing under a constant fundamental value.
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These studies showed that the magnitude of mispricing became much smaller if in
the instructions, an illustration of the declining fundamental value was presented to
the subjects, rather than a table containing the same information (Huber and Kirchler,
2012), or if the word \stock" (the value of which many subjects assumed did not decline
constantly) was explained as \stocks of a depletable gold mine" (Kirchler et al., 2012).
Is it just confusion (i.e., subjects not understanding the declining fundamental value
in these experiments that is not natural in real markets) causing the mispricing? It would
be quite surprising, however, if all the subjects in the experiments were equally confused
given the widely reported heterogeneity in the depth of strategic thinking among subjects
in laboratory experiments (Nagel, 1995; Ho et al., 1998; Costa-Gomes and Crawford,
2006).3 In addition, several studies demonstrated both theoretically (Haltiwanger and
Waldman, 1985, 1989) and experimentally (Fehr and Tyran, 2008; Sutan and Willinger,
2009; Heemeijer et al., 2009; Bao et al., 2012) that such heterogeneity could manifest as
a large deviation from the equilibrium in the presence of positive feedback.4 Because it is
very likely that positive feedback exists in asset markets, confusion or bounded rational
behaviour of a few subjects in a market can be amplied owing to strategic responses by
more sophisticated subjects. This consideration leads us to our main research question:
to what extent is mispricing caused by confusion (or some kind of individual bounded
rationality) and strategic uncertainty? The above-mentioned studies did not investigate
these questions, and thus the relevance of strategic uncertainty in these experiments
remains an open question.
In this paper, we address this open question by eliminating strategic uncertainty as
much as possible by introducing computer traders who follow the equilibrium strategy
(under the usual set of assumptions of prot maximisation and the common knowledge
of rationality). We consider two types of markets (treatments) consisting of six traders:
one human and ve computers (1H5C), and six humans (6H). All subjects were informed
of which treatment they were involved in, and those in 1H5C, but not those in 6H, were
3The theoretical developments that follow these experimental ndings suggest that considering in-
teraction among heterogeneous boundedly rational agents helps us to better understand experimental
outcomes. See Camerer (2003, Ch.5) and Crawford et al. (2013) for further details.
4These experimental analyses considered dierent games. Fehr and Tyran (2008) considered price
setting games, Sutan and Willinger (2009) investigated beauty contest games, while both Heemeijer
et al. (2009) and Bao et al. (2012) investigated price forecasting games. What these studies also showed
was that in the presence of strategic substitution (or negative feedback), the observed outcomes were
much closer to the Nash or rational expectation equilibrium.
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clearly told how computer traders behave. Therefore, in the 1H5C treatment, the single
human trader did not face any strategic uncertainty. Here we mention a couple of
additional design aspects before discussing how our experimental design enabled us to
achieve our objective.
To facilitate the introduction of computer traders, we employ a call market rule
similar to those used by van Boening et al. (1993) and Haruvy et al. (2007) rather than
the continuous double auction employed by Smith et al. (1988) and in various other
studies. In a call market, traders submit buy (sell) orders by specifying the maximum
(minimum) price they are willing to pay (accept) for a unit of asset in each period. This
means that our computer traders, in each period, submit their buy orders (sell orders) by
specifying the fundamental value of the asset in that period as the maximum (minimum)
price they are willing to pay (accept) for a unit of asset. Once all the traders in the
market have submitted their orders, the price that clears the market is calculated, and
all transactions take place at that price among traders who submitted a maximum buying
price no less than, or a minimum selling price no greater than, the market-clearing price.
Note, however, that because of the way computer traders behave, the market prices
in 1H5C follow the fundamental value very closely. Thus, comparing the realised market
prices for the two treatments, 6H and 1H5C, is not informative for our purposes. In-
stead, we elicit subjects' expectations about future prices as in Haruvy et al. (2007), and
compare them for the two treatments. It has been shown that expected future prices
deviate quite substantially from the fundamental value in all human markets (Haruvy
et al., 2007, Figure 3, p. 1909), and that the deviations disappear gradually as subjects
gain experience from trading under the same market conditions. This is similar to what
is observed from the realised prices. Thus, our focus on price forecasts is informative for
studying the cause of realised price deviations.
How then does our design allow us to identify the eect of strategic uncertainty as
well as individual bounded rationality (or confusion) in asset market experiments? Let
us imagine a rational human trader. In the 1H5C treatment, s/he does not face any un-
certainty regarding the behaviour of the other traders in the market. Moreover, given the
behaviour of the computer traders, s/he would expect prices to follow the fundamental
value. Therefore, if we observe any deviation from this expectation in our data, it must
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be due to some kind of individual bounded rationality (or confusion). On the contrary,
in the 6H treatment, the rational human trader is unsure about the behaviour of the
other traders in the market and can expect a variety of outcomes. Of course, we should
not eliminate the possibility that subjects are confused or boundedly rational. Thus, the
observed deviations of price forecasts from the fundamental value in the 6H treatment
are due to both strategic uncertainty and individual bounded rationality. A comparison
of the subjects' price expectations in the 1H5C and 6H treatments, therefore, gives us
a direct measure of the extent to which strategic uncertainty explains the deviation of
price forecasts from the fundamental value.
Several experiments have introduced computer agents that follow equilibrium be-
haviour in laboratory experiments to reduce strategic uncertainty. Cason and Friedman
(1997), in their experiments on price formation in a simple market institution,5 intro-
duced robot traders that followed a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy to facilitate
learning by human subjects.6 Fehr and Tyran (2001) introduced robots that utilised a
Nash equilibrium strategy in their investigation of nominal (money) illusion to decom-
pose the reasons for non-immediate adjustment against negative nominal shocks into
(i) those arising from individual irrationality, and (ii) those due to a lack of common
knowledge of rationality.7 They reported that both individual irrationality (or bounded
rationality) and the lack of common knowledge of rationality (or strategic uncertainty)
contributed equally to the failure of immediate adjustment to the new equilibrium after
a negative nominal shock in the game.8
5Cason and Friedman (1997) did not consider markets for assets with a life of several periods as we
do in this paper.
6It should be noted that when human subjects play against other human subjects who are also
learning, the learning process can be very slow. In addition to robots that follow the Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium strategy (BNE robots), Cason and Friedman (1997) also introduced \revealing robots" whose
behaviour diered from that of the BNE robots, to investigate whether convergence to equilibrium was
due to human subjects mimicking the behaviour of the BNE robots or to their best response against the
BNE robots. Their results suggested the latter.
7Fehr and Tyran (2001) considered price-setting games by varying two aspects of the game: (a)
whether negative nominal shocks were present; and (b) whether a human subject played the game with
other human subjects or with rational computer programs that assumed all players were rational. This
two-by-two design allowed them to achieve the objective of the experiments. This was also discussed
quite extensively in Fehr and Tyran (2005).
8In addition to rational robots that followed the equilibrium strategy, Costa-Gomes and Crawford
(2006) introduced boundedly rational robots that followed Level-1,2,3 or Dominance 1,2 strategies in
their experiments on a two-person guessing game to better analyse the responses of human subjects
who were informed about the behavioural rules of the various opponents. In a dierent strand of the
literature, computer agents were introduced to investigate whether deviations of observed behaviour from
the equilibrium prediction were due to bounded rationality (confusion) or kindness in games such as an
alternative oer bargaining game (Johnson et al., 2002) or public good games (Houser and Kurzban,
5
Our experimental results suggest that strategic uncertainty accounts for about 50%
of the median initial forecast deviation from the fundamental value; the remaining 50%
is due to bounded rationality. Thus, it is not only confusion that causes mispricing in an
experimental asset market; strategic uncertainty also plays an important role. To further
investigate the eect of heterogeneity among subjects, we categorised subjects based on
their scores in the Cognitive Reection Test (Frederick, 2005, CRT) and analysed the data
separately based on the CRT scores. We found that the eect of strategic uncertainty was
much larger (about 70% of the median initial forecast deviation from the fundamental
value) for those with a perfect CRT score. For those with very low CRT scores, on the
other hand, no signicant eect of strategic uncertainty was observed.
In a recent independently conducted study, Cheung et al. (2014) investigated the
eect of uncertainty regarding how others understood the nature of the fundamental
value on mispricing in experimental asset markets by (1) training subjects extensively
on the nature of the fundamental value, and (2) manipulating the subjects' knowledge
about whether others in the same market had received the same training. They found
that the magnitude of mispricing was substantially smaller when all subjects in a market
were trained and knew that all those in the market were trained than the case where all
subjects in a market were trained but were not aware of this. Moreover, in the latter
case, the mispricing was as great as in the case without training. Based on these results,
Cheung et al. (2014) concluded that individual confusion alone could not account for the
observed mispricing, but that uncertainty about how well others understood the nature
of the fundamental value could.
While the setup of Cheung et al. (2014) diers from ours in various respects,9 it would
be an interesting future study to investigate how the eect of strategic uncertainty we
have identied via price forecasts (which accounts for about 50% of the median forecast
deviation) can be amplied so that it accounts for most of the mispricing as reported by
Cheung et al. (2014).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The experimental design is discussed
2002). These studies identied substantial impact of bounded rationality.
9Cheung et al. (2014) used a setup with continuous double auctions, larger and longer markets (ten
traders and 15 periods in each market), and stochastic dividends. Furthermore, they did not elicit price
forecasts as we do in this paper.
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in detail in Section 1. Section 2 presents the results of our experiments, and Section 3
concludes the paper.
1 Experimental Design
We set up an experimental call asset market consisting of six traders, who were either
human subjects or computer programs, and considered two treatments. In the rst,
referred to as the 6H treatment, all six traders were human subjects. In the other,
referred to as the 1H5C treatment, only one of the six traders was human, and the other
ve traders were computer traders who submitted orders at the fundamental value. In
each treatment, subjects were explicitly told about the composition of the six traders in
the market in which they were participating. Moreover, in the 1H5C treatment, subjects
were also informed about the behaviour of the computer traders. Our main focus was to
compare the data for these two treatments to separate the eects of strategic uncertainty
and individual bounded rationality.
In each market, traders could trade an asset with a life of 10 periods. Initially,
all traders were endowed with four units of asset and 520 experimental currency units
(ECUs, which we called Marks). Subjects were also asked to submit their expectations
regarding the future prices of a unit of the asset. We rst describe the trading rule
employed, and then proceed to explain how subjects' expectations about future prices
were elicited.
We used a call market rule similar to that in Haruvy et al. (2007). In each period,
each trader could submit at most one buy order and one sell order.10 An order consisted
of a pair of values: a price and a quantity. When submitting a buy order, a trader had
to specify the maximum price, PD, at which s/he was willing to buy a unit of asset,
and the maximum quantity, QD, s/he was willing to buy. In the same manner, when
submitting a sell order, a trader had to specify the minimum price, PS, at which s/he
was willing to sell a unit of asset, and the maximum quantity, QS, s/he was willing to
sell. We attached three constraints: the admissible price range, a budget constraint, and
10Of course, a trader could choose not to submit any orders by specifying zero as the quantity to
buy and sell. We imposed a 60-second, non-binding, time limit for submitting orders. On reaching the
time limit, subjects were simply informed through a ashing message in the upper right corner of their
screens, to submit their orders as soon as possible.
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the relationship between PD and PS in the case that a subject submitted both buy
and sell orders. The admissible price range was set so that, when QD  1 (QS  1),
PD (PS) was an integer between 1 and 2000, i.e., PD(PS) 2 f1; 2; :::; 2000g. The
budget constraint simply meant that neither borrowing cash nor short selling an asset
was allowed, so that (i) QD  PD  cash holding at the beginning of the period, and
(ii) QS  units of asset on hand at the beginning of the period. The nal constraint
was such that when a trader submitted both buy and sell orders, i.e., QD  1 and
QS  1, the maximum buying price was not greater than the minimum selling price,
i.e., PS  PD. Once all the traders in the market had submitted their orders, the price
clearing the market was calculated,11 and all transactions were processed at that price
among traders who submitted a maximum buying price no less than, or a minimum
selling price no greater than the market-clearing price.12
At the end of each period, for each unit of the asset, 12 ECUs was paid as a dividend.
We selected a xed dividend payment, instead of a stochastic dividend as commonly
considered in the literature, to eliminate all uncertainty other than strategic uncertainty
from the experiment. The dividend could be used to purchase the asset in subsequent
periods. After the nal dividend was paid at the end of period 10, the asset had no value.
Because the asset had no intrinsic value other than this stream of dividend payments, the
fundamental value of a unit of asset at the beginning of period t was FVt = 12 (11  t).
We distributed a table showing the sum of the remaining dividends after the dividend
for each period had been paid out, a value we called the \next value" in the experiment.
Thus, subjects had a table showing FVt for t = 1; 2; :::; 10 and could refer to it any time
during the experiment. This table is given in online Appendix A.
After explanation of the setup of the call market, as well as the table of fundamental
values, subjects in the 1H5C treatment, but not those in 6H, were told the following
about the behaviour of computer traders: \In each period, each computer trader places
buy and sell orders by setting both the maximum price it is willing to pay and the
minimum price it is willing to accept to the next value at the beginning of the period."
11When there were several such prices, the lowest was chosen as the market-clearing price. This was
important to ensure the price did not increase in the absence of transactions at the market-clearing
price.
12Any ties among the last accepted buy or sell orders were resolved randomly. It was possible that no
transaction could take place given the computed market-clearing price.
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Thus, subjects were informed about the exact trading strategy employed by the computer
traders.
Next, we explain how expectations about future prices were elicited. We basically fol-
lowed the design used by Haruvy et al. (2007). At the beginning of each period, subjects
were asked to submit their price forecasts for all the remaining periods in the market.13
In other words, in period t, each subject submitted 11 t forecasts.14 Therefore, subjects
submitted a total of 55 price forecasts over the 10 periods. Subjects were informed that
they would receive the following bonus payment based on how accurate their forecast
prices were:
Bonus (in ECUs) = 0:5%
 (number of forecasts that were within  10% of the actual market price)
 nal cash holding in period 10: (1)
Therefore, if all 55 forecasts were within 10% of the realised prices, the subject would
receive 27.5% of his/her nal cash holding as a bonus payment. This incentive scheme
for accurate forecasts was chosen to reduce subjects' incentive to inuence the prices
to move closer to their forecasts by incurring losses.15 During the submission of price
forecasts, all previous market-clearing prices were shown on the screen.
The call market rule had several advantages: (i) the prices subjects had to forecast
were clear; (2) learning based on observing orders submitted by other traders within a
period was not possible; and (3) it was easier to introduce computer traders because all
orders were submitted simultaneously.
At the end of each period, subjects were informed about the market-clearing price
13Although this was not stated explicitly in the instructions, each price forecast took the form of an
integer value between 0 and 2000. We set this range to match the admissible values of orders. If subjects
tried to submit a value outside this range, an error message stating that the forecast had to be within
the given range was displayed on their computer terminal.
14We imposed a 120-second, non-binding time limit for submitting price forecasts. When the time
limit was reached, subjects were simply told, through a message ashing in the upper right corner of
their screens, to submit their forecasts as soon as possible.
15As noted by Haruvy et al. (2007), there is a trade-o between an incentive for accurate transactions
and an incentive for maximising prot from trading. In other words, because we asked subjects to
submit their forecasts before submitting their order, it could be possible that if the incentive for accurate
forecasts was too great, subjects would submit potentially loss-making orders to inuence the prices to
move closer to their forecasts. In our design, since the bonus for accurate forecasts was a fraction of the
nal cash holding, this incentive was reduced. It is, of course, best to have both accurate forecasts and
high prot from trading.
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for the period, the units of asset they had traded,16 their cash and asset holdings, the
number of price forecasts that were within 10% of the actual market prices up to that
period, and the \next value" of a unit of the asset, which was equal to 12 (10  t) at
the end of period t.
The same group of traders, with identical initial endowments of cash and assets,
repeated the same 10-period market three times as one experiment. We refer to a 10-
period market as a round.17
At the end of the experiment (after participating in three rounds of the 10-period
market), subjects were paid in cash the sum of their nal cash holdings (including the
bonus payment for accurately predicting future market prices) for each round plus a
participation fee of 500 yen. We used an exchange rate between ECUs and Japanese
yen of 1 ECU = 1 Japanese yen. The experiment lasted about two and a half hours
including the explanation of the instructions and completion of a questionnaire after
the experiment.18 The questionnaire included the Cognitive Reection Test (Frederick,
2005). Subjects earned on average about 4000 yen.
2 Results
A series of computerised experiments were conducted at the University of Tsukuba be-
tween May and July 2013. The experiments were implemented using z-tree (Fischbacher,
2007). A total of 173 subjects (72 subjects in 6H and 101 subjects in 1H5C), who had
never participated in a similar experiment, were recruited from across the campus via
e-mails and yers. Subjects had to register on our database before the experiment, so
that we could verify their lack of participation in past experiments by checking their
names, student ID numbers, and e-mail addresses.
In this paper, we focus on the initial deviation of price expectations from the funda-
mental value, realised prices, and dynamics on forecast deviations.
16In the presentation of this information, a positive (resp. negative) number denoted that they had
bought (resp. sold) a certain number of units of asset.
17Before entering round 1, there was a practice period to allow subjects to familiarise themselves with
the user interface of the software. Subjects were given their initial endowment of cash and assets, and
asked to enter their price forecasts for the 10 periods and their orders for period 1. Information regarding
the resulting market-clearing price, amongst others, was not shown to the subjects.
18See online Appendix B for the English translation of the instructions.
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Fig. 1: Distributions of RAFD1;1 for 1H5C (dashed, N=101) and 6H (solid, N=72).
Note: In all subsequent gures, p-values are given for a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) two-
tailed test as well as a Mann-Whitney (MW) two-tailed test.
2.1 Deviation of Forecasts
In each period, subjects forecast prices for all the remaining periods within the round.
To better summarise the magnitude of forecast deviations from the fundamental value
(referred to as forecast deviations below) for each subject, we introduced a measure
of forecast deviations similar to the mispricing metric, that is, the relative absolute
deviation (RAD) proposed by Stockl et al. (2010).
For subject i, the magnitude of the forecast deviations for the forecasts submitted in
period t of round r was measured by the relative absolute forecast deviation (RAFDit;r)
dened as:
RAFDit;r =
1
T   t+ 1
TX
p=t
jf it;p;r   FVpj
FV
(2)
where T is the number of periods (T = 10 in our experiments), f it;p;r is the forecast
of period p's asset price submitted by subject i in period t of round r, FVp is the
fundamental value of the asset in period p, and FV is the average fundamental value of
the asset over all periods.19
Figure 1 shows the distributions of RAFDi1;1 for 6H (solid lines) and 1H5C (dashed
lines). As shown in the gure, the observed distributions as well as the median values of
RAFDi1;1 for the two treatments dier signicantly.
19We omit subscript r for FVp, FV , and T because these values remained constant over all three rounds
of our experiment. One could also consider normalising the measure using the average fundamental value
of the asset over the remaining periods after period t. We avoided doing this to keep the denominator
constant for all t.
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Recall that the eect of individual bounded rationality (or confusion) is measured by
the forecast deviations in the 1H5C treatments, while the eect of strategic uncertainty
is measured by the dierence between the forecast deviations for the 1H5C and 6H treat-
ments. Since the median RAFD1;1 values are 0:583 for 6H and 0:315 for 1H5C, about
54% (=0.315/0.583) of the median initial forecast deviation is due to individual bounded
rationality, while the remaining 46% (0.268/0.583) is due to strategic uncertainty.
2.2 Cognitive Ability and Strategic Uncertainty
We identied a signicant eect of strategic uncertainty based on the price forecasts
submitted at the beginning of round 1 in each experiment. If subjects are heterogeneous
in terms of their depth of strategic thinking or cognitive ability, it may be sensible to
investigate beyond the median eect based on between-subject design. Because this is
possible, even with a random allocation of subjects between treatments, we still have
heterogeneous subject pools in the two treatments. In this subsection, we report our
analysis of the cognitive ability of subjects measured by the Cognitive Reection Test
(Frederick, 2005, CRT). This test consists of the following three simple questions, struc-
tured in such a way that intuitive or \impulsive" (Frederick, 2005, p. 26) answers are
incorrect:
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How
much does the ball cost? cents.20
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100
machines to make 100 widgets? minutes.
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the
patch to cover half of the lake? days.
In all three questions, some cognitive reection is necessary to overcome impulse and
arrive at the correct answers. The score of this test, computed simply as the number
of correct answers to the three questions, has been shown to correlate negatively with
20In translating this question into Japanese, we changed $1.10 and $1.00 to 11,000 and 10,000 yen,
respectively.
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Table 1: CRT Scores
Treatment N CRTS=0 CRTS=1 CRTS=2 CRTS=3
6H 72 8 17 26 21
1H5C 101 8 19 26 48
incidence of the conjunction fallacy and conservatism in updating probabilities (Oechssler
et al., 2009). Bra~nas-Garza et al. (2012) reported that subjects with higher CRT scores
on average, chose numbers closer to the Nash equilibrium in beauty contest games.
Corgnet et al. (2014) and Breaban and Noussair (2014) reported that subjects with
higher CRT scores tended to realise higher prot margins than those with low CRT
scores in experimental asset markets. Here we are interested in the correlation between
the CRT score (CRTS) and the magnitude of the initial forecast deviation.
Table 2.2 shows the frequencies of subjects with various CRTSs in each treatment.
The average score of the 173 subjects is 2.01. Since the number of subjects with CRTS= 0
is small, we created three groups based on CRTS: low (CRTS 1), medium (CRTS= 2),
and high (CRTS= 3).
Figure 2 shows the distributions of RAFD1;1 in the 6H (solid lines) and 1H5C (dashed
lines) treatments for three groups of subjects: low CRTS (left), medium CRTS (middle),
and high CRTS (right). While the distributions of RAFD1;1 for the two treatments
are not signicantly dierent for low and medium CRTS subjects, there is a signicant
dierence for high CRTS subjects.21 For high CRTS subjects, the median RAFD1;1
values are 0:570 in 6H and 0:183 in 1H5C. Thus, about 32% (0.183/0.570) of the median
Low (CRTS 1) Medium (CRTS= 2) High (CRTS= 3)
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 RAFD
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CDF
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 RAFD
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CDF
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 RAFD
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CDF
p = 0:744 (KS) p = 0:733 (KS) p = 0:009 (KS)
p = 0:819 (MW) p = 0:365 (MW) p = 0:054 (MW)
Fig. 2: Distributions of RAFD1;1 in 6H (solid lines) and 1H5C (dashed lines) for Low
(left), Medium (middle), and High (right) CRTS subjects.
21P -values are reported in the gure.
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p = 0:888 (KS) p = 0:101 (KS)
p = 0:938 (MW) p = 0:141 (MW)
Fig. 3: Distributions of RAFD1;1 for High CRTS Subjects (solid lines) and Low CRTS
Subjects (dashed lines) in 6H (left) and 1H5C (right).
initial forecast deviation stems from individual bounded rationality, while the remaining
68% is due to strategic uncertainty for these subjects. Compared with the result based
on all the data, the eect of strategic uncertainty is much more pronounced for high
CRTS subjects. For those with lower CRTSs, on the other hand, no signicant eect of
strategic uncertainty is found.
It is quite clear from Figure 2 that the magnitude of RAFD in the 1H5C treatment is
much smaller for high CRTS than low CRTS subjects. On the other hand, the magnitude
of RAFD in the 6H treatment does not seem to vary across the three groups.
This is conrmed by Figure 3, which shows the distributions of RAFD1;1 for high
CRTS (solid lines) and low CRTS (dashed lines) subjects in the 6H (left) and 1H5C
(right) treatments. We omitted medium CRTS subjects to focus on the two extreme
groups. In the 6H treatment, the distributions of RAFD1;1 for the two groups of subjects
are very similar, except for very high RAFD values, and are not signicantly dierent.
On the other hand, the two distributions appear to be quite dierent in the 1H5C
treatment, although this dierence is not statistically signicant.
The insignicant dierence between the two distributions of RAFD1;1 in the 6H
treatment22 shows that the total initial eects of bounded rationality and strategic un-
certainty are not signicantly dierent for these two groups of subjects, although the
eect of confusion on low CRTS subjects is much larger as shown in the 1H5C treat-
ment. It is as if the lack of confusion by less-confused subjects (high CRTS subjects)
22If anything, the distribution of RAFD1;1 for high CRTS subjects lies to the right of that for low
CRTS subjects.
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Dynamics of prices in 6H (12 groups)
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Dynamics of prices in 1H5C (51 groups)
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
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Fig. 4: Dynamics of Realised Prices in 6H (top) and 1H5C (bottom) for Three Rounds.
is compensated by their belief in the confusion of others (strategic uncertainty). This
nding on the forecast deviations is very similar to the result of Cheung et al. (2014) who
reported that the magnitude of mispricing was equally large in two market conditions:
one where the subjects were not trained, and the other in which, despite being trained,
the subjects were uncertain whether all the other subjects had been trained.23
2.3 Dynamics: Prices and Forecasts
Thus far, we have only considered the forecasts submitted before subjects observed any
prices. In what way did subjects change their forecasts after observing the realised
prices? To answer this question, we rst summarise the realised price data and then
move on to the dynamics of forecast deviations.24
23We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this similarity.
24There was an error in the parameter settings of some of the 1H5C sessions, which resulted in four
subjects and 20 computer traders interacting in one group instead of one subject and ve computer
traders. This error did not have any eect on the initial forecast deviations (which is why we used all
the data in the previous analysis). As for later rounds/periods, although subjects observed the same
price dynamics as most of the others in cases without errors (prices following the fundamental value),
the error may have had an impact on how a subject forecasted in a later round if the subject experienced
outcomes that could not occur in the true setting. Such outcomes were either (1) a subject obtaining
more than 24 units of stock, or (2) a subject submitting a buy order for more than the total availability
(QD  24   number of stocks he has) and seeing the price strictly below what s/he had specied in
his/her order (PD). In the following analysis of the dynamics of forecast deviations, we omitted those
subjects (six in total) in 1H5C who experienced such outcomes. Out of these six subjects, two had
CRTS= 2 while the remaining four had CRTS= 3. For the price dynamics, we omitted all the data
from sessions with an error, simply because the prices always followed the fundamental value in these
sessions.
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Round 2
Dynamics of median RAFDt;2 Distribution of RAFD
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Fig. 5: Dynamics of the Median RAFDt;r (left), and Distributions of RAFD
i
1;r+1 (right)
in Period 1 of the Next Round for 1H5C (dashed lines) and 6H (solid lines) in Round 1
(top) and Round 2 (bottom).
Note: The p-values are given for two-tailed KS and MW tests. In conducting the statis-
tical tests, for 6H we took the mean RAFD values for the six traders in the same group
and used these as independent observations.
Figure 4 shows the dynamics of the realised prices over three rounds in 6H (top) and
1H5C (bottom). As expected, the prices in the 1H5C treatment followed the fundamental
value except for a few rare cases in which a single human subject dominated one side of
the market by placing a buy order with a large quantity at a price above the fundamental
value (period 9 in round 2 and period 10 in round 3). In the 6H treatment, on the other
hand, prices deviated from the fundamental value in round 1. Such deviations of prices
from the fundamental value gradually disappeared in rounds 2 and 3 as subjects gained
experience from trading in the same market environment with a group of subjects as
reported in the literature.
Next, we turn to the dynamics of the forecast deviation. How quickly did subjects in
1H5C learn to forecast prices to follow the fundamental value? What about the subjects
in 6H? The left panel of Figure 5 shows the dynamics of the median RAFDt;r over 10
periods in rounds 1 (top) and 2 (bottom). It is clear that the subjects in 1H5C (dashed
lines) learned much more quickly than those in 6H (solid lines) to forecast prices that
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Round 1, 1H5C
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Round 2, 1H5C
Dynamics of median RAFDt;2 Distribution of RAFD
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Fig. 6: Dynamics of the Median RAFDt;r (left), and Distributions of RAFD
i
1;r+1 (right)
in Period 1 of the Next Round for Low CRTS (dashed lines) and High CRTS (solid lines)
Subjects in Round 1 (top) and Round 2 (bottom) in 1H5C.
followed the fundamental value. As can be seen in the right panel of the gure, by the
beginning of round 2 (3), close to 80 % (90%) of the subjects in the 1H5C treatment
(dashed lines) had RAFD = 0, whereas this was not the case for subjects in the 6H
treatment (solid lines). These dierences, however, are quite natural given the dierences
in the realised prices in the two treatments. As shown in Figure 4, while subjects in the
1H5C treatment saw prices that were exactly the same as the fundamental value in every
period, those in the 6H treatment saw prices that deviated greatly from it.
What about the similarities (in 6H) and dierences (in 1H5C) of initial RAFD be-
tween high and low CRTS groups observed above? Did they disappear or persist once
subjects in a market observed the same prices and started learning?
We start with the dierences in initial RAFD between the two extreme CRTS groups
in 1H5C. Given the dynamics of the median RAFD in 1H5C treatments, one could easily
imagine that the initial dierence between the two CRTS groups would disappear quickly
in this treatment. Figure 6 shows that this was indeed the case.25
What about the initial similarities of RAFD between high and low CRTS groups in
25Although the dierences between the distributions of RAFD for the two extreme CRTS groups at
the beginning of rounds 2 and 3 are statistically signicant, their magnitudes are very small.
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Round 1, 6H
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Round 2, 6H
Dynamics of median RAFDt;2 Distribution of RAFD
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Fig. 7: Dynamics of the Median RAFDt;r (left), and Distributions of RAFD
i
1;r+1 (right)
in Period 1 of the Next Round for Low CRTS (dashed lines) and High CRTS (solid lines)
Subjects in Round 1 (top) and Round 2 (bottom) in 6H.
Note: We tested whether the within-group dierences between the average RAFD values
of the two groups of subjects dier from zero (two-tailed signed rank-sum (SRS) test).
the 6H treatment? Did they persist or did they disappear as subjects started learning?
Figure 7 shows that the RAFD values of these two CRTS groups continued to be similar
in later periods and rounds.
By comparing the right panels in Figures 6 and 7, it can easily be seen that the
distributions of RAFD for the 1H5C and 6H treatments at the beginning of rounds 2
and 3 are signicantly dierent for both low and high CRTS groups.
We interpret these convergences of RAFDs among CRTS groups in each treatment as
being the result of subjects' adaptive learning based on commonly observed prices. This
has been demonstrated by Haruvy et al. (2007) in the context of a similar asset market
experiment, and by Hommes et al. (2005), Heemeijer et al. (2009), Bao et al. (2012), and
Anufriev and Hommes (2012) in the context of dierent price-forecasting experiments.
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3 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated to what extent forecast deviations in experimental asset
markets are caused by individual bounded rationality (or confusion) and by strategic
uncertainty (uncertainty about others' behaviour) to better understand the source of
mispricing in these experimental markets. We compared the initial price forecasts sub-
mitted by subjects in two market environments: one in which all six traders were human
subjects (6H), and the other where one human interacted with ve computer traders
whose behaviour was known (1H5C).
Our analysis shows that about 50% of the median initial forecast deviation is due to
confusion and the remaining 50% is due to strategic uncertainty. We also found that
the eect of strategic uncertainty is greater for those subjects with a higher cognitive
ability that manifests as a higher score in the CRT (Frederick, 2005). For those with a
perfect CRT score, individual bounded rationality accounts for about 30%, while strate-
gic uncertainty accounts for the remaining 70% of the median initial forecast deviation
from the fundamental value. For those with lower CRT scores, we did not observe any
signicant eect of strategic uncertainty.
Our results show that both strategic uncertainty and individual bounded rationality
(or confusion) have signicant power in explaining the initial forecast deviations. While
confusion clearly plays an important role in causing mispricing in these experimental
asset markets as recently emphasised by Huber and Kirchler (2012) and Kirchler et al.
(2012), so too does strategic uncertainty as conjectured by Smith et al. (1988) and
recently demonstrated by Cheung et al. (2014). Subjects being confused cannot be the
whole story behind the bubble.
Cheung et al. (2014) reported very similar ndings to ours regarding the eect of
confusion and strategic uncertainty despite a number of dierences in (a) the experi-
mental setup, (b) key experimental manipulation, and (c) data investigated (i.e., ob-
served/forecasted prices). Both our results and those of Cheung et al. (2014) point
to the importance of (1) better understanding of how subjects with varying degrees of
\confusion" form their beliefs of others, and (2) how such heterogeneity leads to varying
behaviour among subjects in these markets. Addressing these issues is left for future
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research.
We make one nal remark before closing the paper. It is quite well known that
experiences in trading in the same market environment help subjects \learn" to trade
at prices closer to the fundamental value and to forecast prices accordingly. We have
seen that dierences in forecast deviations among CRTS groups disappear in 1H5C,
whereas their similarities persists in 6H treatments. We interpret these outcomes as
being the result of subjects learning adaptively based on commonly observed prices.
What happens if the common experience among subjects is broken owing to the inow
of new and inexperienced subjects or changes in the market environments? Hussam et al.
(2008) and Deck et al. (2014) showed that these changes can re-generate large mispricing,
but both articles remain silent as to the relative eects of the post-shock confusion and
strategic uncertainty that caused such mispricing to re-emerge. We believe this is also an
interesting issue to investigate, and have taken a step toward addressing it in Akiyama
et al. (2014).
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Appendix A. Table of fundamental values given to
the subjects
No. of remaining periods Dividend Next value
At the end of period 1 9 12 108
At the end of period 2 8 12 96
At the end of period 3 7 12 84
At the end of period 4 6 12 72
At the end of period 5 5 12 60
At the end of period 6 4 12 48
At the end of period 7 3 12 36
At the end of period 8 2 12 24
At the end of period 9 1 12 12
At the end of period 10 0 12 0
Next value before the beginning of period 1 is 120.
The value of any stock is zero after the nal dividend payment in period 10.
1
